In this document we will analyze security threats on VoIP (Voice over IP) and TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio) solutions and mitigation techniques, if applicable.
network is susceptible to denial of service (DoS) attacks since DoS attacks can degrade Quality of Service (QoS) quickly to unacceptable level [5] . Traditional DoS attacks against data networks are still very dangerous. However, our focus is on VoIP specific DoS attacks.
VoIP (Voice Over IP)
The security concerns of VoIP telephone systems are similar to those of any Internet-connected device. This means that hackers who know about these vulnerabilities can institute denial-of-service attacks, harvest customer data, record conversations and compromise voicemail messages. The quality of internet connection determines the quality of the calls. VoIP phone service also will not work if there is power outage and when the internet connection is down. The 9-1-1 or 112 service provided by VoIP phone service is also different from analog phone which is associated with a fixed address. The emergency center may not be able to determine your location based on your virtual phone number. Compromised VoIP user account or session credentials may enable an attacker to incur substantial charges from third-party services, such as long-distance or international telephone calling.
The technical details of many VoIP protocols create challenges in routing VoIP traffic through firewalls and network address translators, used to interconnect to transit networks or the Internet. Private session border controllers are often employed to enable VoIP calls to and from protected networks. Other methods to traverse NAT (Network Address Translation) devices involve assistive protocols such as STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT) and Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE).
Many consumer VoIP solutions do not support encryption of the signaling path or the media, however, securing a VoIP phone is conceptually easier to implement than on traditional telephone circuits. A result of the lack of encryption is that it can be relatively easy to eavesdrop on VoIP calls when access to the data network is possible. Free open-source solutions, such as Wireshark, facilitate capturing VoIP conversations.
Standards for securing VoIP are available in the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) and the ZRTP (Z and Real-time Transport Protocol) protocol for analog telephony adapters as well as for some softphones. IPsec is available to secure point-to-point VoIP at the transport level by using opportunistic encryption.
Government and military organizations use various security measures to protect VoIP traffic, such as voice over secure IP (VoSIP), secure voice over IP (SVoIP), and secure voice over secure IP (SVoSIP). The distinction lies in whether encryption is applied on the telephone or on the network or both. Secure voice over secure IP is accomplished by encrypting VoIP with protocols such as SRTP or ZRTP. Secure voice over IP is accomplished by using Type 1 encryption on a classified network, like SIPRNet (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network). Public Secure VoIP is also available with free GNU programs and in many popular commercial VoIP programs via libraries such as ZRTP.
Confidentiality

Eavesdropping of phone conversation
Conventional telephone eavesdropping requires either physical access to tap a line, or penetration of a switch. With VoIP, opportunities for eavesdroppers increase dramatically because of the large number of nodes in the path between two conservation entities. If the attacker compromises any of these nodes, he can access the IP packets flowing through that node. There are many free network analyzers and packet capture tools that can convert VoIP traffic to wave files. These tools allow the attackers to save the conversation into the files and play them back on a computer. VoMIT (Voice over Misconfigured Internet Telephones) is an example of such a tool. Ethereal can also be used to record Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) packets and retrieve voice messages in wav file format [3] .
Unauthorized access attack
Unauthorized access means that the attacker(s) can access resources on a network where they do not have the authority. Shawn Merdinger reported multiple undocumented ports and services in certain VoIP phones. There are also vulnerabilities due to implementation issues.
There are systems for call control, administration, billing and other voice telephone functions. Repositories in these systems may contain passwords, user identities, phone numbers, and private personal information. Lots of gateways and switches are shipped with default well-known passwords. If these passwords are left without changes, the attackers can easily break in. Some switches still use TELNET (Telecommunication Network) for remote access. The clear-text protocol exposes everything to anyone who can sniff the network traffic. Some of the gateways or switches might have a web server interface for remote control. The attacker might sniff the HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) traffic in local network to steal sensitive information. Attackers can also use ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) cache poisoning to forward all traffic through their machines to capture network traffic.
Countermeasures
Encryption of voice message packets can protect against eavesdropping. IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) can be deployed to encrypt whole packets. SRTP (Secure Real-time Transport Protocol) can provide confidentiality, message authentication and replay protection for audio and video streams.
For better protection for gateways and switches, one should use SSH (Secure Shell) instead of other clear-text protocols as remote access protocol. If web-based interface is provided, HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) should replace HTTP. In addition, all default passwords should be changed before the system is plugged into the network. An up-to-date intrusion detection system might detect ARP poisoning and other types of attacks.
Integrity
Caller ID (Identification) spoofing
It is the practice of causing the telephone network to indicate to the receiver of a call that the originator of the call is a station other than the true originating station. For example, a Caller ID display might display a phone number different from that of the telephone from which the call was placed. The term is commonly used to describe situations in which the motivation is considered malicious by the speaker or writer.
Registration hijacking
Registration hijacking refers to a situation where an attacker replaces the legitimate registration with a false one, thereby causing inbound calls to go to a nonexistent device or another SIP device, possibly including a rogue application. For example, an attacker could route the CEO's calls to their internal IP phone.
Proxy impersonation
Proxy impersonation occurs when an attacker tricks one of your SIP User Agents or proxies into communicating with a rogue proxy. If an attacker successfully impersonates a proxy, he has access to all SIP messages and is in complete control of the call.
VoIP signaling dos attacks
The attackers can abuse signaling protocol to conduct denial of service attacks. In most cases the attackers can create large number of call setup requests that consume the processing power of the proxy server or terminal.
VoIP media dos attacks
Attackers can flood gateway, IP phone and other media-processing VoIP components with large number of RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) packets. If the target is forced to drop RTP packets, the voice quality will be degraded.
Moreover, the attacker might knock key components like gateway offline. A failure in one of these devices could bring the entire voice network to a halt. Since RTP is encapsulated in UDP (User Datagram Protocol), it is easy to crack.
Physical dos attacks
These attacks include power outrage and physical damage to network components. Traditional telephone operates at 48 volts supplied by the telephone line itself and can operate smoothly during a power failure. VoIP cannot operate without power supply. Besides, an attacker with physical access to any key components of VoIP network can disrupt its normal operations easily. He can plug out the power cord or network cable.
Countermeasures
To mitigate VoIP signaling and media DoS attacks, strong authentication is the key. VoIP components need to make sure that they are communicating with legitimate counterparts. VoIP firewall should also be implemented to monitor streams and filter out abnormal signals and RTP packets [1] . Media and signal rate limits can be set by observing normal traffic patterns. To mitigate physical DoS attacks, strict physical security schemes should be implemented with restricted areas, access control, locks, guard, etc. To guarantee continuous power supply, backup power generation system should be available.
Tetra (Terrestrial Trunked Radio)
The area of TETRA security is extensive; as it needs to provide different levels of security ranging from what is acceptable on commercial networks to what is acceptable on a national public safety network. The security mechanisms in the standard are covered through Authentication, Air Interface Encryption (AIE) and End to End encryption. The threats to Confidentiality, Authenticity, Integrity, Availability as well as Accountability are covered with those three mechanisms [2] .
The standard based services are constantly being expanded by a sub-group of the Association -Security and Fraud Prevention Group (SFPG).
Mutual Authentication is a service required to ensure that a TETRA system can control access to it and for a radio terminal to check if a network can be trusted. In TETRA, as in most other secure systems, authentication is the basis for much of overall network security and can also be used to ensure validated billing in public access systems, and can provide the foundation for a secure distribution channel for sensitive information such as other encryption keys. The mutual authentication security mechanisms protect both Voice and Data services [4] .
The TETRA standard supports four AIE TETRA Encryption Algorithms (TEAs), these being TEA1, TEA2, TEA3 and TEA4. There are differences in the intended use and the exportability of equipment containing these algorithms. For example, TEA2 is intended for use by public safety users in Schengen and related European countries only; the others have wider applications ranging from general commercial use to public safety use in regions where TEA2 is not used [6] . The main benefit of over the air encryption is that it protects all signaling and identities as well as user speech and data. This provides an excellent level of protection from traffic analysis as well as from eavesdropping. The encryption system is closely bound to the TETRA signaling protocols and the algorithms can (if desired) be implemented as software within radio terminals and base station equipment, instead of using encryption modules, which could consume space and increase cost.
The TETRA standard also supports End to End encryption using a variety of encryption algorithms as deemed necessary by national security organizations. The TETRA Association Security and Fraud Prevention Group has extended the work carried out in the TETRA standard to define a general framework for the incorporation of End to End encryption. Recommended sample solutions have also been provided for the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) (IPR -Intellectual Property Rights owned by Ascom) and the newer Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm (IPR free), which benefits from a larger cryptographic algorithm block size. Custom and indigenous algorithms are also possible with End to End encryption, although these are not recommended for air interface encryption due to their need for integration in signaling protocols and availability of standard compliant terminals.
Besides these cores security capabilities TETRA can also support a wide range of security management capabilities such as those used to control, manage and operate the individual security mechanisms in a network. The most important of these is Encryption Key management, which is fully integrated in TETRA standard functions. Even though security functions are integrated in a network this does not automatically imply that a network is fully secure. However, what is normally achieved is that the security risks are "condensed", that is they are concentrated to specific elements in the network, which can be adequately controlled.
Further 
Attacks and Breaches
Pindrop Security, one of the leading providers of Caller Anti-Fraud and Authentication for Enterprise Contact Centers, estimated an increase of 45% of Call Center Fraud since 2013. Moreover, 1 in every 2,000 calls proved to be fraudulent, while fraud losses have increased 14% in the last 2 years [7] .
In order to identify Fraud Risk Factors, companies are advised to implement multi-layered solutions that quickly and accurately detect fraud. They should look for solutions that offer comprehensive protection across the entire call center infrastructure, including both IVR and live agent. Call centers should understand their expected fraud exposure and average loss.
The UK has had chip card technology for many years. This has resulted in a doubling of fraud rates and more attacks originating domestically. As physical card security in the US increases, US call centers should expect to see a spike in call center fraud.
In 2015, enterprises lost an average of $0.65 to fraud per call. This means a call center that receives 40 million calls per year should expect to see somewhere between $17 million to $27 million in fraudulent transaction losses annually. Phone fraud losses have grown 14 percent since 2013, when the average loss was $0.57 per call. According to a recent survey by the Aite Group, 72% of contact center executives expect this fraud loss trend to continue on an upward trajectory, almost doubling in the next five years [8] .
Voice over IP (VoIP) phones are the fraudster's first choice of devices when it comes to making fraud calls. In the past year, 16 percent of legitimate callers used a VoIP device, yet 42 percent of fraud callers did so.
